MN 25 Nivāpasutta

The sutta is rather strange, as it leads us to the conclusion that only the cessation of perception and feeling (the ninth jhāna or āyatana) constitutes liberation from Māra and leads to the Deathless (Nibbāna).

The four jhānas and four āyatanas (formless jhānas) are enumerated, and each description ends with the words:

“He is a monk who has blinded Māra, completely gouged out Māra’s eyes, and gone where the Evil One cannot see him.”

The final attainment, the cessation of perception and feeling, has a different ending:

“He is a monk who has blinded Māra, completely gouged out Māra’s eyes, and gone where the Evil One cannot see him. He has completely freed himself from attachment to the world.”

Indhana, Upādāna, Upādhi, and Nirvāṇa

He who is without parts and actions, who is tranquil, blameless, and free from attachments, who is the supreme bridge to immortality—like a fire that has consumed all its fuel.

— Śvetāśvatara Upaniṣad VI.19

The Sanskrit (or Pāli) word translated here as “fuel” is indhana. Indhana refers to something combustible, such as firewood or cow dung—literally, “kindling” or “fuel for lighting a fire.”

“But, Vaccha, suppose someone were to ask you: ‘This fire in front of you that has gone out—in which direction has it gone: east, south, west, or north?’ How would you answer?”

“That question does not apply, Master Gotama. The fire burned in dependence on fuel—grass and wood. When that fuel is exhausted and no new fuel is supplied, the fire is said to have gone out for lack of sustenance.”

— Majjhima Nikāya 72 (MN 72)

The Pāli word translated here as “extinguished” is nibbuto, a term also used to describe someone who has attained nibbāna (Sanskrit: nirvāṇa).

The Sanskrit or Pāli word used here, commonly translated as “fuel,” is not indhana at all, but upādāna (although it is often translated precisely in that way…).

The word upādāna literally means “taking up” or “appropriation.” But what does this have to do with fire and fuel?

When a fire burns, it takes hold of and consumes logs and grass, depending on them as its source of sustenance. This is precisely why the logs serve as upādāna for the fire—that is, as its nourishment or “food.”

Soil and water are likewise upādāna for a plant, meaning nourishment, just as food is upādāna for a living being.

The corresponding verb is upādiyati—“to take,” “to acquire,” or “to appropriate.”

When upādāna is exhausted, the fire goes out (nibbuto).

In this analogy, there is a play on the meanings of indhana and upādāna. Fire serves as a symbol of desire and passion in other Pāli suttas, while in the Vedas it symbolizes Brahman.

Upādhi — Limiting Conditions

And the final word for today is upādhi.

This concept derives from upādiyati—appropriating or acquiring—and denotes something that has been taken up or appropriated.

This appropriation limits that which has taken it up. Upādhi conditions an object and imposes limitations upon it.

Consider, for example, damp fuel. Here, moisture functions as an upādhi for the fuel: it restricts its properties. Fire itself is a general phenomenon that may or may not be accompanied by smoke, whereas damp fuel invariably produces smoke.

At the same time, upādhi does not alter the fuel itself but limits and constrains it through its association with it.

Another example is a red flower that, through proximity, appears to impart its redness to a transparent crystal. In this case, the red flower serves as an upādhi for the crystal.

Thus, upādhi can be understood as something that conceals the true nature of things.

In reality, not all fuel produces smoke. Yet, observing smoke from damp fuel, we mistakenly attribute smokiness to fuel itself.

The crystal is not actually red, but it appears red to us precisely because of upādhi.

The same applies to Brahman.

Upādhi—limiting conditions—conceals Brahman, making it appear as God, the individual soul, or the world.

But in reality, Brahman is like a fire that has consumed all its fuel.

When upādāna (substratum, fuel) and upādhi disappear, the fire is extinguished (nibbuto).

This is nibbāna, nirvāṇa—and the light of ultimate reality.

Textual note: The translation above preserves your interpretation rather than treating every philosophical connection as an established equivalence. The Sanskrit of Śvetāśvatara Upaniṣad 6.19 does contain dagdhendhanam (“whose fuel has been consumed”), and MN 72 does use upādāna in its fire analogy. The Upanishads+1

However, identifying the cessation of upādāna and upādhi with the revelation of Brahman is a comparative philosophical interpretation, not a conclusion explicitly stated in MN 72.

Dhī, Dhyāna, Jhāna, and the Ancient Idea of Inner Vision

Dhī, Dhyāna, Jhāna, and the Ancient Idea of Inner Vision

There is an interesting thread running through the history of Indian concepts that conventional translations often obscure.

The Sanskrit word dhī is usually translated as “intellect,” “understanding,” “thought,” “prayer,” or “wisdom.” But in Vedic language, the word carries a much more distinctive semantic nuance.

Dhī is not simply the ability to know something. In studies of Vedic religious poetry, it has repeatedly been associated with vision, insight, and inspired perception—the ability to see a truth inaccessible to ordinary perception. Jan Gonda, for example, specifically emphasized this “visionary” character of dhī.

The semantic development can therefore be understood not as a transition from one abstract concept to another, but as the gradual unfolding of a single image:

Seeing → looking intently → contemplating → perceiving → comprehending.

And this is specifically inner vision.

The Vedic “seer” is not necessarily someone who looks at a physical object with their eyes. Rather, it is someone to whom something hidden is revealed, someone capable of perceiving reality through inner insight.

Thus, what matters most in dhī is not merely the capacity to “know,” but the capacity to see and comprehend.

Dhī → dhyā → dhyāyati

This is where things become particularly interesting.

Classical Sanskrit has the verbal root √dhyai, with the present-tense form dhyāyati, meaning “to contemplate,” “to direct one’s inner perception toward something,” and, in later dictionaries, also “to imagine,” “to hold in mind,” or “to meditate upon.”

Together with the noun dhyāna, we obtain:

dhyai → dhyāyati → dhyāna

Traditional grammar treats dhyai as an independent verbal root. In comparative-historical linguistics, however, there is also an analysis connecting dhyā with dhī through ancient root-vowel alternation. It is therefore more appropriate to speak of a related and semantically connected domain rather than a mechanical transformation of one word into another.

But what is especially interesting is what dhyāyati actually means in ancient texts.

A particularly revealing passage occurs in the Chāndogya Upaniṣad VII.6:

dhyānaṃ vāva cittād bhūyaḥ

“Dhyāna is indeed greater than citta.”

And then:

dhyāyatīva pṛthivī

dhyāyatīvāntarikṣam

dhyāyatīva dyauḥ

The earth seems to contemplate, the intermediate space seems to contemplate, the heavens seem to contemplate. The same sequence goes on to include waters, mountains, gods, and human beings.

This is a highly unusual use of the word.

We are not dealing here with a description of a human intellectual process. The earth does not engage in reasoning. The heavens do not analyze an object.

Here, dhyāyati denotes a particular mode of being and perceiving—contemplative presence.

This is precisely why translating it with the modern word “thinking” misses the essential point.

Dhyāna and Vision

An even more direct connection appears in the Śvetāśvatara Upaniṣad:

dhyānanirmathanābhyāsād devaṃ paśyen nigūḍhavat

Here, dhyāna is directly connected with the verb paśy-, “to see.”

The meaning is literally structured around the possibility of seeing what is hidden:

dhyāna → paśyet → to see.

This is a crucial detail for understanding the entire history of the concept.

Contemplation is not opposed to seeing.

To contemplate is to see in a particular way.

Not with the eyes, but through inner perception; not the surface of a phenomenon, but what lies concealed behind it.

Thus, the sequence

dhī → dhyāyati → dhyāna

can be understood as the development of a single semantic field:

Inner vision → contemplation → comprehension.

From Dhyāna to Buddhist Jhāna

In the Buddhist tradition, Sanskrit dhyāyati corresponds to Pāli jhāyati, while dhyāna becomes jhāna.

This relationship is well established in Pāli-Sanskrit lexicography: jhāna is directly connected with Sanskrit dhyāna, and jhāyati with dhyāyati.

It is especially important not to interpret Buddhist jhāna as a rejection of the ancient meaning of contemplation.

On the contrary, the contemplative meaning is preserved, but receives an exceptionally precise psychological elaboration.

In early Buddhism, jhāna comes to designate a profound state of inner contemplation in which various obstacles gradually disappear and the very structure of experience changes.

In the first jhāna, certain factors of the contemplative process are still present. The second, third, and fourth jhānas are then characterized by the successive disappearance of some factors and the preservation of others.

We can therefore identify the following progression:

Inner contemplation → removal of obstacles → purification of consciousness → increasingly pure vision.

This is no longer merely the meaning of an individual word, but an elaborately developed system for describing states of consciousness.

Yet the original image does not disappear. It remains the same:

Inner contemplation as a way of seeing.

Dhyāna in Patañjali’s Yoga

In Patañjali, this ancient conceptual domain acquires an even more rigorous structure.

The Yoga Sūtras enumerate the eight limbs of yoga as follows:

yama-niyama-āsana-prāṇāyāma-pratyāhāra-dhāraṇā-dhyāna-samādhayo ‘ṣṭāv aṅgāni

The final three form a particularly important sequence:

dhāraṇā → dhyāna → samādhi.

And here it is essential to read three sūtras together.

III.1 — deśa-bandhaś cittasya dhāraṇā

Consciousness is bound to a particular deśa—a place, region, or object of perception.

III.2 — tatra pratyayaikatānatā dhyānam

Here, dhyāna proper begins.

The key word is ekatānatā: continuity, homogeneous extension, absence of interruption.

And pratyaya is the content presented to consciousness, that through which the chosen object is perceived.

Thus, for Patañjali, dhyāna is not simply directing consciousness toward something.

It is the uninterrupted flow of one and the same content of perception.

In dhāraṇā, consciousness is bound to a particular domain.

In dhyāna, this connection becomes continuous.

In samādhi, the next step occurs.

III.3 — tad evārthamātranirbhāsaṃ svarūpaśūnyam iva samādhiḥ

Now, only artha—that which is contemplated—seems to remain, and it “shines forth,” nirbhāsa.

The perceiver’s own form appears, as it were, to have been eliminated.

And here we encounter a particularly interesting vocabulary of vision and manifestation:

nir-bhās — to shine, to manifest, to become visible.

Thus, Patañjali’s sequence can be read as a gradual transformation of the very nature of perception:

  • Dhāraṇā — consciousness is bound to a particular domain.
  • Dhyāna — perception of that domain becomes uninterrupted.
  • Samādhi — the object of perception appears in itself, without the ordinary sense of a separate perceiver.

This is precisely why dhyāna in Patañjali is much more accurately understood as uninterrupted contemplation than reduced to a generic modern term.

It is not the name of a separate “exercise.”

It is a particular structure of inner perception.

Moreover, Patañjali himself places these three states in a single sequence: dhāraṇā, dhyāna, and samādhi together constitute saṃyama. The very next sūtra states that mastery of this process gives rise to prajñā, a special form of insight or knowledge.

And this brings us back to the original dhī.

We began with the capacity to see and comprehend.

In Patañjali, uninterrupted inner contemplation gives rise to prajñā—a particular kind of insight.

The result is a remarkably coherent semantic progression:

Inner vision → contemplation → uninterrupted contemplation → insight.

The Later History of Dhyāna

In later Indian traditions, dhyāna becomes an established technical term.

The Maitrī Upaniṣad enumerates six limbs of yoga:

prāṇāyāmaḥ pratyāhāro dhyānaṃ dhāraṇā tarkaḥ samādhiḥ

And shortly afterward, the language of vision reappears:

anena yadā paśyan paśyati…

“Through this, when the seer sees…”

Thus, dhyāna is already part of an elaborated yogic system, yet the language of paś- — “to see” has by no means disappeared.

The dating of this section of the Maitrī Upaniṣad is uncertain, and it is often regarded as a later textual layer. What is particularly interesting here, therefore, is not which system appeared first, but the fact that the ancient association between contemplation and vision continues to survive within a new systematization.

Śaṅkara

By the eighth century CE, this terminology was already firmly established.

Śaṅkara does not create the concept of dhyāna anew. He inherits it as an established technical term and employs it within the Vedāntic context.

In his commentary on the Brahma Sūtras 4.1.8 — dhyānāc ca — dhyāna is described as the uninterrupted flow of homogeneous contents of perception, samāna-pratyaya-pravāha.

Here, the ancient idea receives another formulation:

Contemplation is the continuity of a single content of inner perception.

And the ultimate goal of this development is now expressed in terms of the realization of Brahman.

Thus, over several centuries, the same word passes through different systems while retaining a recognizable semantic core:

dhī → inner vision → dhyāyati → dhyāna → jhāyati → jhāna → yogic systematization → Patañjali → Śaṅkara.

Throughout this development, one particularly important image remains:

Vision that takes place within.

And Now — the Slavic div-

Here we encounter another parallel, one that requires considerably greater caution but is nonetheless very interesting.

The Slavic languages contain an entire family of words:

дивиться → удивляться → диво → дивный → дивление

Approximately:

To marvel → to be amazed → a wonder → wondrous → wonderment.

The Russian verb дивиться means to turn one’s attention toward something unusual, to look at it intently, to perceive something astonishing that goes beyond the ordinary.

From this, a natural semantic sequence emerges:

Seeing → looking intently → contemplating → perceiving the extraordinary → marveling.

And then:

Marveling → a marvel.

In other words, диво (divo) is something revealed to perception as unusual, astonishing, and worthy of contemplation.

This produces an intriguing parallel.

In the Indian sequence:

Seeing → contemplation → inner vision → dhī → dhyāna → jhāna.

In the Slavic sequence:

Seeing → looking intently → perceiving the extraordinary → divit’sya → divo.

Of course, semantic similarity alone is insufficient to establish that these words are etymologically related.

A genuine comparative-historical conclusion requires regular phonetic correspondences and a reconstructible Proto-Indo-European root.

Nevertheless, the semantic picture itself deserves attention.

It is possible that behind these different branches lies a very ancient conception in which seeing, contemplation, perception, and comprehension still formed a unified semantic field.

The Indian development would then look like this:

dhī → inner vision → contemplation → dhyāna → jhāna

And the Slavic development:

Seeing → contemplating → perceiving → marveling → a marvel.

And perhaps the original semantic center of this entire domain was not what we today call reasoning, but precisely vision—not discursive thought, but inner perception, contemplation, and the discovery of what had previously been hidden.

Buddha and Shiva: Two Traditions of an Ancient Contemplative World?

At first glance, Buddhism and Shaivism appear to be entirely different religious and philosophical traditions. One is associated with the Buddha, awakening, and nirvana; the other with Shiva, cosmic destruction, and liberation. Early Buddhism makes no metaphysical assertion of an Absolute, whereas Shiva may be understood as the supreme reality, absolute consciousness, or the foundation of all existence.

However, if we examine these traditions not so much through their metaphysics as through contemplative practice, the image of the perfected yogin, bodily symbolism, and conceptions of the cessation of ordinary existence, a number of remarkable parallels emerge.

Could these similarities point to a common foundation? And might the differences between the traditions be explained by their distinct interpretations of the same experience—one through the image of Shiva and absolute reality, the other through awakening and cessation?

1. Buddha and Shiva: Perfect Contemplatives

Let us begin with the most obvious similarity: both Buddha and Shiva embody the image of a being absorbed in deep contemplation, detached from worldly life and its endless activity within samsara.

The Buddha is not merely a teacher who communicates philosophical propositions. His awakening is inseparable from contemplative practice. In early Buddhist texts, the path to nirvana is intimately connected with the cultivation of samādhi and the successive jhānas—contemplative states characterized by withdrawal from sensual pleasures and worldly involvement. The Buddha is a yogin who lives outside ordinary social life and possesses perfect self-mastery.

Shiva, in turn, is firmly associated with the image of the great yogin—one who exists beyond conventional social life, remains uninvolved in everyday desires, and possesses perfect self-mastery. In later iconography, he is frequently depicted seated in a contemplative posture, alone on a mountain or in a remote place.

It is important, however, to distinguish historical layers. The familiar image of Shiva as a yogin developed gradually and cannot simply be projected back into the Vedic period. Nevertheless, the early sources already contain Rudra, a deity later closely associated with Shiva, while later Upanishadic texts introduce conceptions that identify Rudra-Shiva with the supreme reality.

Thus, both traditions place at their center a figure for whom the decisive element is not external activity but withdrawal from the world and entry into a special contemplative state attained through inner practice.

2. The Awakened One and the Auspicious One

There is also a noteworthy similarity at the level of names and epithets.

The word Buddha (बुद्ध) means “awakened.” It derives from the Sanskrit root √budh, associated with awakening, awareness, and understanding. The Buddha is one who has awakened.

One of the most important epithets of the Buddha in Pāli texts is Bhagavā, corresponding to Sanskrit Bhagavat. It is variously translated as “the Blessed One,” “the Venerable One,” or “the Exalted One.”

The name Śiva (शिव), in turn, means “auspicious,” “benevolent,” “gracious,” or “bringing good fortune.” In Vedic texts, śiva originally appears as an adjective and epithet, including in reference to Rudra. Over time, it becomes the proper name of the deity.

This does not mean that Bhagavā and Śiva share the same etymology: they are not the same word. Yet the semantic parallel is evident. In one case, we have the Awakened and Blessed One; in the other, Rudra, called the Auspicious One, who subsequently becomes Shiva.

This similarity alone may not establish a historical connection. Nevertheless, considered alongside other parallels, it deserves attention.

3. Destruction of the World and Cessation of the World

Another parallel concerns the relationship of both traditions to ordinary existence.

Shiva is known as the Destroyer—one of the principal figures in the cosmic cycle of creation, preservation, and destruction. Yet his destructive function is not simply annihilation for its own sake. In certain Shaiva systems, destruction signifies the end of limited existence, the dissolution of forms, and a return to the supreme ground of reality.

Early Buddhism has no equivalent figure of a cosmic destroyer. It does, however, contain another idea: the cessation of conditioned existence as liberation.

The Buddhist term nirodha means cessation, extinction, or stopping, depending on the context. The cessation of craving forms the basis of the Third Noble Truth, while nirvana is associated with the extinguishing of craving, hatred, and delusion.

A structural similarity can be recognized here: the ordinary world, as experienced through conditionality, desire, and involvement, must be transcended or brought to cessation for liberation to become possible.

For a Shaivite, this may mean returning to Shiva as absolute reality, to the attributeless Brahman, or to pure consciousness, depending on the particular school. In early Buddhism, the goal is nirvana, but not the return of an eternal self to Brahman: early Buddhist teaching does not affirm a permanent, independent ātman.

Consequently, the parallel does not necessarily lie in identical ultimate metaphysics, but rather in a shared orientation of practice: the cessation of the ordinary mode of existence becomes a condition for liberation.

4. The Meditator Goes Beyond the World

A seated yogin is not simply someone resting or thinking. In contemplative practice, the body assumes a stable posture, external activity is minimized, and habitual involvement in the sensory world diminishes.

In early Buddhism, the development of the jhānas involves progressively abandoning certain forms of sensory involvement and mental activity. This does not mean the literal destruction of the world, but it does entail a profound transformation in one’s relationship to it and in the manner of experiencing it.

In Shaiva traditions, yogic practice may likewise be understood as a movement beyond the ordinary, conditioned state of consciousness. In certain systems, liberation is described as the recognition of one’s true nature—Shiva or absolute consciousness.

This suggests an intriguing interpretation: the contemplative practitioner symbolically brings ordinary life to an end, as though dying to the everyday world, though not in any physical sense. The practitioner moves beyond the habitual stream of desires, actions, and perceptions.

In the Buddhist context, this may be associated with the cessation of craving and liberation from conditioned existence; in the Shaiva context, with overcoming limitation and recognizing the supreme reality.

This does not imply that the two teachings are literally identical. It does, however, raise a common question: might both traditions derive from an ancient conception of contemplation as a means of bringing the ordinary human condition to an end?

5. The Lotus Posture, Shiva, and the Lingam-Yoni

Bodily symbolism offers another basis for comparison.

The Buddha is traditionally depicted sitting cross-legged in a contemplative posture. Shiva is similarly often represented in a yogic posture. In both cases, the position of the body signifies stability, stillness, and a distinctive state opposed to ordinary activity.

In certain interpretations of lingam-yoni symbolism, one might propose an additional meaning: the lingam as a vertical axis or body, and the yoni as the base surrounding it—forming an image reminiscent of a seated figure with crossed legs.

Such an interpretation is interesting within the hypothesis that Shiva’s symbolism has a contemplative foundation. However, it must be regarded as a hypothesis rather than an established meaning of the lingam-yoni. In traditional Hindu symbolism, this pair has its own meanings associated with Shiva and Shakti, creation, and cosmic power. There is no generally accepted historical evidence that the lingam and yoni originally encoded the posture of a yogin.

Nevertheless, the question remains intriguing: could bodily forms, contemplative postures, and symbols of axis and foundation have developed within the broader context of ancient Indian practices?

6. Rudra and the Early History of Yoga

Rudra, the Vedic god whom later tradition closely associates with Shiva, is particularly important for examining this hypothesis.

In the Rigveda, Rudra appears as a powerful, dangerous, yet benevolent deity. The epithet śiva—”auspicious” or “benevolent”—is applied to him before Shiva becomes an independent and widely recognized divine name.

Chronology, however, must be respected. We cannot automatically identify the Vedic Rudra with the yogin familiar from later representations of Shiva. Centuries of transformation separate the early Vedic hymns, the early Upanishads, the emergence of Buddhism, and the development of mature Shaiva iconography.

Ancient depictions of seated figures are of particular interest, especially the so-called “Pashupati Seal” from Mohenjo-daro. John Marshall interpreted the figure depicted on the seal as an early form of Shiva or Pashupati. This identification, however, remains controversial: the script of the Indus civilization has not been deciphered, and the meaning of the image has not been conclusively established.

We therefore cannot claim with certainty that the seal depicts Rudra or a historical yogin belonging to a particular tradition. Nevertheless, the very existence of an ancient image of a seated, horned figure surrounded by animals makes the history of contemplative symbolism a subject worthy of investigation.

7. The Buddha’s Vajra and Shiva’s Trident

Another visual parallel concerns the vajra and the trident.

The vajra was originally closely associated with Indra in Vedic mythology. In later Buddhism, particularly Vajrayāna, it acquires central symbolic importance and becomes associated with indestructibility, awakening, and a particular understanding of reality.

The trident is one of Shiva’s most recognizable attributes. It is associated with his divine power and receives different interpretations across various traditions.

Both symbols may represent power, the overcoming of limitations, and transformation. Historically, however, they are distinct objects with different traditions of use. The vajra and trident cannot be regarded as variants of the same symbol without additional evidence.

Furthermore, early Buddhism must be distinguished from later Vajrayāna: the central role of the vajra in Buddhist symbolism should not automatically be projected back into the period of the early Nikāyas and Āgamas.

8. Lingam-Yoni, Contemplative Posture, and Bodily Symbolism

Bringing together the preceding observations suggests a broader hypothesis: bodily imagery in ancient Indian traditions may have expressed not only anatomical or cosmogonic ideas, but also notions of an axis, stillness, stability, and transcendence of ordinary activity.

In Buddhist contemplation, the body becomes a stable foundation for practice. In the image of Shiva, the deity’s own body may represent the ideal yogin. In lingam-yoni symbolism, the body, axis, and foundation acquire cosmic significance.

One might hypothesize that these motifs developed within a cultural environment in which contemplative stillness, yogic practice, and conceptions of a cosmic foundation were closely interconnected.

9. One Practice, Different Metaphysics?

We can now turn to the central question.

Suppose that early Buddhists and followers of traditions associated with Rudra-Shiva inherited certain shared contemplative practices. These practices involved stable bodily postures, withdrawal from sensory involvement, deep meditative absorption, and the cessation of habitual mental activity.

Different interpretations of this experience could then have emerged.

In Shaiva and Vedāntic traditions, the ultimate goal may be described in terms of Shiva, absolute consciousness, or nirguṇa Brahman—Brahman without attributes. In such systems, liberation may mean recognizing the absolute ground of being or realizing unity with it.

Early Buddhism approaches the same problem differently. Buddhist texts describe the jhānas, liberation, and nirvana, but do not require liberation to be explained through an eternal Self or a return to Brahman. Moreover, the early Buddhist critique of the notion of a permanent, independent ātman makes a straightforward identification of these metaphysical systems impossible.

And yet the question remains: could the same practice, or related practices, have received different philosophical interpretations?

If so, the difference between Buddhism and Shaivism would not necessarily be that one tradition preserved the practice while the other lost its metaphysical foundation. Other possibilities exist: Buddhism may have consciously rejected certain metaphysical explanations; early Buddhists may have considered them unnecessary; or both traditions may have transformed a more ancient inheritance in different ways.

Conclusion: Two Traditions of a Shared Ancient Contemplative World?

The parallels between Buddha and Shiva can be organized into several interconnected themes:

  • Buddha and Shiva as ideal contemplatives and yogins.
  • Buddha as the Awakened and Blessed One; Shiva as the Auspicious One, originally an epithet of Rudra.
  • The cessation of conditioned existence in Buddhism and the destruction of limited forms in Shaiva cosmologies.
  • Contemplative stillness as a means of transcending ordinary involvement in the world.
  • The lotus posture, the image of the yogin, and possible parallels with lingam-yoni symbolism.
  • The vajra and the trident as powerful symbols of transformation and the overcoming of limitations, despite their distinct histories.
  • A possible shared heritage of ancient Indian contemplative practices that subsequently received different philosophical and religious interpretations.

Taken individually, these parallels may have different explanations. Considered together, however, they allow us to raise a question that goes beyond a simple comparison of religious imagery.

Could early Buddhism and the traditions associated with Rudra and Shiva have developed within a shared ancient Indian world of contemplative practices, offering different answers to the question of what exactly is revealed to a person when their ordinary state of consciousness comes to an end?

A Shaivite might explain liberation through Shiva, absolute consciousness, or the attributeless Brahman. A Buddhist might explain it through awakening, the cessation of craving, and nirvana. These answers are not identical. Yet perhaps they arose within a historical environment in which related practices and conceptions of contemplation as a path beyond ordinary human existence already existed.

From Ritual to Consciousness: How Indian Thought Sought Liberation from Karma

At the foundation of most Indian religious and philosophical traditions lie two closely related ideas: karma — action and its consequences, and saṃsāra — the cycle of birth and death sustained by those actions.

The essence of the problem is fairly simple: every action we perform has consequences. We affect the world around us and change it, but at the same time, we also shape our own destiny. Moreover, the consequences of our actions are not limited to a single human lifetime; they determine future births. Thus, a person becomes entangled in an endless chain of conditioned existence.

The origins of these ideas remain a subject of historical research. Johannes Bronkhorst, for example, argues that the doctrine of karma and rebirth developed within the religious culture of what he calls Greater Magadha, outside the original Vedic Brahmanical tradition, and was only later adopted by Brahmanism.

Within the Vedic tradition itself, ritual action held enormous significance. Karman literally means action or deed, and in a ritual context, it refers to the performance of a particular rite.

Ritual was not understood merely as a symbolic appeal to the gods. It was an action possessing real, in a certain sense magical, power. A correctly performed ritual produced a specific result, influenced a person’s destiny, and maintained cosmic order.

Hence the exceptional importance of performing rituals correctly, following prescribed procedures precisely, and the special role of Brahmins — specialists who possessed the necessary knowledge.

In early Vedic thought, the concept of universal order was expressed through ṛta, while later dharma came to occupy a central position, signifying law, norm, and the proper order of things. Acting in accordance with this order meant maintaining the proper structure of human life and the world.

It was precisely this understanding of the efficacy of correctly performed ritual that formed the foundation of the Brahmanical religious tradition. Brahmins possessed knowledge of the necessary prescriptions and performed rituals both for themselves and for others. Carrying out prescribed actions was regarded as fulfilling the proper order — dharma. Ritual was not a secondary aspect of religious life but one of its central foundations.

Yet underlying all of this was a fundamental problem shared by Indian religious thought: if actions produce consequences, and those consequences condition future births, how can one escape this endless cycle at all?

It is around this question, in my view, that a significant part of the subsequent history of Indian religious thought unfolded.

One answer was Brahmanical ritualism: one must perform the correct actions, in the correct order, and according to established prescriptions. Ritual, performed by a knowledgeable person in strict accordance with the rules, was regarded as a means of achieving the desired result and overcoming the unfavorable consequences of existence. This ritual tradition continued to develop and eventually received systematic justification within Brahmanical philosophy.

However, alongside the ritualistic tradition, other approaches existed and developed within the religious environment of ancient India, proposing their own ways of addressing the problem of karma and liberation.

What if the decisive factor is not the action itself, but the state of mind in which it is performed? What if simply performing a ritual correctly is insufficient, and the action must instead be accompanied by a particular kind of concentration, reflection, or meditation? Perhaps it is precisely one’s inner attitude toward an action that determines its consequences?

This gives rise to a line of thought in which working with one’s own mind becomes increasingly important. What matters is not only what a person does, but also how they think, what they desire, what they strive for, and with what intention they act. It was precisely this approach to inner transformation that later received particularly profound development in Buddhism.

Another possible answer: what if actions should be performed without personal interest in their results? If one does not seek the fruits of one’s actions and does not become attached to them, perhaps those actions will cease to bind a person through new karmic consequences? This idea developed within Indian religious thought and later found particularly vivid expression in the Bhagavad Gītā, in its teaching of action without attachment to its fruits.

Finally, another answer: what if it is better to stop acting altogether? If every action generates karma, then ceasing activity should prevent its further accumulation. It is precisely this line of thought that we encounter in Jainism. The Jain tradition placed particular emphasis on restricting activity, asceticism, strict self-control, and nonviolence toward living beings. The goal was not only to stop the influx of new karma but also to eliminate karma already accumulated.

These approaches did not necessarily emerge sequentially or develop from one another. Rather, they represented different, often parallel responses to a single fundamental problem: what exactly binds a person to saṃsāra, and how can that bond be broken?

A particularly interesting answer appears already in the early Upaniṣads.

In the Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad, the idea develops that liberation is achieved not so much through correct action as through knowledge of one’s own true nature — the Ātman.

In the famous statement from the Bṛhadāraṇyaka (1.4.10):

ahaṃ brahmāsmi — “I am Brahman.”

This concerns the realization of the fundamental identity of Ātman and Brahman. It is not about perfecting ritual action, nor simply about ceasing activity, but about realizing the truth concerning one’s own nature.

At the same time, the Bṛhadāraṇyaka (4.4.5) directly connects desires, intentions, and actions: as a person’s desire is, so is their resolve; as their resolve is, so is their action; and as their action is, so is the result they attain.

Here we see how the question of karma shifts into the inner world of the individual.

Liberation becomes associated with understanding what the true self is and overcoming ignorance concerning one’s own nature. This line of thought later received systematic philosophical development in Vedānta, particularly in Śaṅkara’s Advaita Vedānta, more than a millennium after the earliest Upaniṣads.

By that time, however, Buddhism had already existed for centuries and had offered an entirely different answer to the same problem.

The Buddha radically reinterpreted the very nature of karma.

He rejected the idea that liberation could be attained through the correct performance of rituals, sacrifices, or knowledge of an eternal Ātman.

For him, the decisive factor was not the external action in itself, but the intention with which it was performed and the mental processes conditioning human behavior.

In the Aṅguttara Nikāya (AN 6.63), the Buddha explicitly states:

“It is intention (cetanā), monks, that I call karma. Having intended, one acts through body, speech, and mind.”

This represents a fundamentally important shift. Karma is now understood primarily in terms of intentional activity rather than the ritual efficacy of an external act.

Consequently, if we wish to stop generating karmic causes, we must work not so much with external actions as with what gives rise to them: desires, intentions, attachments, ignorance, and other states of mind.

Hence the particular importance of meditation, concentration, ethical discipline, and wisdom. The mind must be purified of defilements, the causes generating new karmic consequences must be eliminated, and further becoming must thereby be brought to an end.

And here the concept of saṅkhāra (Sanskrit: saṃskāra) becomes especially interesting.

It derives from the prefix saṃ- and the root √kṛ — “to do,” “to perform,” “to create.” The word karma derives from the same root.

Saṅkhāra can therefore be understood through two interconnected meanings: the act of making and what has been made, the process of creating and that which is created as a result.

It is precisely this duality that is particularly important for understanding the Buddhist use of the term.

Saṅkhāras are not merely some kind of “formations,” as they are often translated. In the context of karmic conditioning, they are primarily creative, conditioning activity directly connected with intention and karma.

In the Saṃyutta Nikāya (SN 22.79), the Buddha explains the term saṅkhāras through their activity of creating or constructing what is conditioned. The Pāli text uses words derived from the same root: saṅkhārā, abhisaṅkharonti, saṅkhataṃ.

In other words, saṅkhāras are that which makes or creates, while the result is what has been made or created.

In the context of dependent origination, saṅkhāras represent karmically effective activity that conditions further existence. Intention (cetanā) plays the decisive role here: it is precisely intention that gives an action its karmic character.

In a broader usage, saṅkhāras can also refer to conditioned, constructed phenomena themselves. Thus, the term encompasses both the activity of creating and its conditioned result.

The ancient problem of action and its consequences thereby acquires an entirely new dimension in Buddhism. What was previously understood primarily as external action affecting the world is now analyzed as the conditioning activity of the mind, generating further consequences.

In this respect, Buddhism represents a transition from the ritual management of the consequences of action to an investigation of the very mechanism by which those consequences arise.

This does not mean that external actions become irrelevant. The Buddhist path includes ethical conduct, right speech, and right action. But what becomes decisive is their inner conditioning: intention, desire, ignorance, or, conversely, freedom from them.

Thus, the cessation of karma is achieved neither through simply abandoning all activity nor through performing a special ritual. It is connected with eliminating the mental causes that make activity karmically conditioning.

And here we return to the original question.

The same fundamental problem — action, its consequences, and the cycle of rebirth — gave rise to several fundamentally different answers within Indian thought.

The ritual tradition sought efficacy in correctly performed action and knowledge of ritual order.

The Upaniṣadic tradition of knowledge sought liberation through realizing the true nature of Ātman and its relationship to Brahman.

Jainism sought liberation through stopping the accumulation of karma by restricting activity, practicing asceticism, and eliminating previously accumulated karma.

The tradition of detached action sought freedom through performing actions without attachment to their fruits.

Buddhism sought liberation through transforming the mind itself, eliminating ignorance, craving, and intentional activity that sustains saṃsāra.

Thus, the history of Indian religious thought can be understood as the history of different attempts to resolve one fundamental problem: how our own actions shape our future destiny, and what must be changed — the action itself, our attitude toward it, our knowledge of ourselves, or the very mechanism of intention — in order to finally transcend karmic conditioning.

It is precisely the differences between the answers to this question, in my view, that allow us to understand not only the common foundations of many Indian religious and philosophical ideas, but also the profound differences between the traditions that developed around them.

On Samskara

I have wanted to write this post for a long time, but kept forgetting.

The Sanskrit/Pali word samskara/saṅkhāra has some beautiful Russian equivalents that correspond quite closely in terms of word structure and grammatical category.

karman — action, deed, doing; from the root √kṛ, which goes back to the reconstructed Proto-Indo-European root *kʷer- “to do, to make, to create, to accomplish.”

saṃskāra — “co-doing,” “making,” “bringing into being,” “creation.” The prefix sam- is related to the Russian prefix so- and has a similar meaning: togetherness, combination, bringing something together, completing or bringing to fullness. The word can also convey the result of the process: something done, accomplished, created — in a literal word-formational sense.

It is also interesting to trace two more related roots in Russian and English.

The Russian root char- (“charm, enchantment”) is connected by some etymologists with the same Indo-European root *kʷer- “to do, to create,” through the idea of an action that produces an effect (a magical or transformative action). In this perspective, through the development of the meaning “an action that has an effect,” one can see a conceptual closeness to Russian charovanie (“enchantment, charm, magic”): saṃskāra could then be understood as something “enchanted,” “transformed by an act of power,” or the very process of such an enchantment.

This sense of the root was already present in Vedic times, when karman referred primarily to ritual action, ceremony, and sacrifice. It has survived in Indian traditions to the present day: saṃskāras are the important rites of passage in a person’s life — not merely actions, but specifically sacred ritual actions. A “co-doing” in the sense of a transformative sacred act.

In the Latin branch of Indo-European, the same root gave rise to creare — “to create, to bring forth.” In this sense, one possible close rendering of saṃskāra would be “creation,” “formation,” or “that which has been created.”

On Upādāna

Who is without parts, without actions, peaceful, blameless, unattached, the supreme bridge to Immortality, like a fire that has consumed all its fuel

Shvetashvara Upanishad VI 19

The Sanskrit/Pali word translated as fuel here is indhana, indhana is something capable of burning, like firewood, cow dung, this is exactly fuel, as the root ind means to kindle.

But Vaccha, suppose they were to ask you: ‘This fire in front of you that is quenched: in what direction did it go—east, south, west, or north?’ How would you answer?
It doesn’t apply, worthy Gotama. The fire depended on grass and logs as fuel. When that runs out, and no more added, the fire is reckoned to have become quenched due to lack of food

MN 72

The Pali word translated as quenched here is nibbuto, that one who reached nibbana (Sanskrit Nirvana). The Sanskrit/Pali word used here and translated regularly as fuel here is not indhana at all, it is upādāna and (although it is commonly translated as such)

Upādāna is translated literally as taking up, what is the relation to fire and fuel then? When fire burns it takes up, consumes logs, grass, it depends on it as its sustenance, so that is why logs are upādāna for the fire, and in this simile when sustenance, the food. The soil and water for a plant are also upādāna, sustenance, food as the food is upādāna for a living being.
The corresponding verb is upādiyati, to take up, to acquire.
When upādāna ends, the fire gets quenched (nibbuto) In this simile it is a wordplay, based on indhana/upādāna, on the fire being the symbol for desire and passion in other Pali suttas and the fire being the symbol of Brahman in Vedas.

And the last word for today upādhi, it is something that is a result of upādiyati, an acquisition, something that was taken up, that is something that has been taken and becomes attached. That attachment limits the one which took up the attachment, upādhi. And it conditions the object, limits it. Like damp fuel, damp is here the upādhi for fuel, it limits it when attached, like fire itself is a general object which may give out smoke or not, but damp fuel give out smoke always. The upādhi does not change the fuel though, but limit and restricts it when being attached to it. Another illustration is that of a red flower which transfers its property of redness to a clear crystal due to their proximity. In this case the red flower is the upādhi of the crystal

So upādhi can be considered as something that disguise the reality, not every fuel gives smoke, that is the reality, but seeing the damp fuel gives smoke disguise fuel as smoky. The crystal is not red but we think it is red because of upādhi

Same with Brahman, upādhi disguise it as God, soul, world, but actually Brahman is like a fire that has consumed all its fuel, no more upādāna, no more upādhi, fire gets quenched (nibbuto), it is nibbana and the true reality shines.

The sun does not shine there

Where water and earth, fire and air have no footing – there no star does shine nor does the sun shed its light; there the moon glows not, yet no darkness is found. And when a sage, a brahmin, finds understanding through their own sagacity, then, from forms and formless, from pleasure and pain they are released.

Udana 1.10

The sun does not shine there, nor the moon and the stars, nor these lightnings-not to speak of this fire. He shining, everything shines after Him. By His light all this is lighted

Katha Upanishad 2.2.15, Shvetashvara Upanishad VI. 14

On six sense organs

When we speak of the six senses, modern readers often assume a biological interpretation: the eye is the physical organ of sight, the ear the organ of hearing, and so on. In the philosophical traditions of ancient India, however, the senses were understood primarily as faculties involved in the arising of experience. The Upaniṣads and early Buddhist texts both examine the six senses in this broader sense, describing their functions and their role in perception and cognition. Viewed together, these teachings present complementary perspectives on the nature of the senses and the way experience is formed.

From Atman are born prana, mind and all the sense organs

Mu Up II i.3

When it does the function of living, It is called the prana, when It speaks, the organ of speech, when It sees, the eye, when It hears, the ear and when It thinks, the mind. These are merely Its names according to its functions

Br Up I. iv. 7

Reverend, these five faculties have different domains and different ranges, and don’t experience each other’s domain and range. That is the faculties of the eye, ear, nose, tongue, and body. What do these five faculties, with their different domains and ranges, have recourse to? What experiences their domains and ranges? These five faculties, with their different domains and ranges, have recourse to the mind. And the mind experiences their domains and ranges

MN 43

Mendicant, suppose a person had never seen a parrot tree before. They’d go up to someone who had seen a parrot tree and ask them, ‘My man, what’s a parrot tree like?
They’d say, ‘A parrot tree is blackish, like a charred stump.’ Now, at that time a parrot tree may well have been just as that person saw it. Not content with that answer, that person would go up to a series of other people and receive the following answers: A parrot tree is reddish, like a scrap of meat, a parrot tree has flaking bark and burst pods, like a lebbeck tree, a parrot tree has luxuriant, shady foliage, like a banyan.
Now, at each of those times a parrot tree may well have been just as those people saw them.

SN 35.245

Brahman/Atman fancies:

This is I, This is mine, and fetters himself by his own actions as a bird by its nest

Mai Up III. 2

Is the eye the fetter of sights, or are sights the fetter of the eye? Is the ear … nose … tongue … body … mind the fetter of ideas, or are ideas the fetter of the mind?
Reverend Kāmabhū, the eye is not the fetter of sights, nor are sights the fetter of the eye. The fetter there is the desire and greed that arises from the pair of them. The ear … nose … tongue … body … mind is not the fetter of ideas, nor are ideas the fetter of the mind. The fetter there is the desire and greed that arises from the pair of them

SN 35.233

Mendicants, an unlearned ordinary person speaks of the ocean. But that’s not the ocean in the training of the Noble One. That’s just a large body of water, a large sea of water. For a person, the eye is an ocean, and its currents are made of sights. For a person, the ear … nose … tongue … body …mind is an ocean, and its currents are made of ideas

SN 35.228

Grasping arises:

There are sounds … smells … tastes … touches … ideas known by the mind, which are likable, desirable, agreeable, pleasant, sensual, and arousing. These are called the things that fuel grasping. The desire and greed for them is the grasping

SN 35.123

Suppose there was a latex-producing tree—such as a peepal, a banyan, a wavy leaf fig, or a cluster fig—that’s a tender young sapling, if a man were to chop it here and there with a sharp axe, would latex come out? Yes, sir. Why is that? Because it still has latex.” “In the same way, take any monk or nun who, when it comes to sights known by the eye, still has greed, hate, and delusion, and has not given them up. When it comes to sounds … smells … tastes … touches … ideas known by the mind, they still have greed, hate, and delusion, and have not given them up.

SN 35.231

But actually:

And what is empty of self or what belongs to self? The eye, sights, eye consciousness, and eye contact are empty of self or what belongs to self

SN 35.85

And the path is:

Mendicants, develop immersion. For a mendicant with immersion, things become truly clear. And what becomes truly clear? It becomes truly clear that the eye, sights, eye consciousness, and eye contact are impermanent. And it also becomes truly clear that the painful, pleasant, or neutral feeling that arises dependent on eye contact is impermanent.

SN 35.160

Mendicants, I will teach you a practice that’s conducive to extinguishment. Listen… What do you think, mendicants? Is the eye permanent or impermanent?
Impermanent, sir
But if it’s impermanent, is it suffering or happiness?
Suffering, sir
But if it’s impermanent, suffering, and perishable, is it fit to be regarded thus: ‘This is mine, I am this, this is my self’?
No, sir.
Are sights …eye consciousness … eye contact …The pleasant, painful, or neutral feeling that arises dependent on mind contact: is that permanent or impermanent
Impermanent, sir
But if it’s impermanent, is it suffering or happiness?
Suffering, sir.
But if it’s impermanent, suffering, and perishable, is it fit to be regarded thus: ‘This is mine, I am this, this is my self’
No, sir.
Seeing this, a learned noble disciple grows disillusioned with the eye, sights, eye consciousness, and eye contact. And they grow disillusioned with the painful, pleasant, or neutral feeling that arises dependent on eye contact, they grow disillusioned with the ear … nose … tongue … body … mind … painful, pleasant, or neutral feeling that arises dependent on mind contact. Being disillusioned, desire fades away, when desire fades away they’re freed, they understand: ‘… there is nothing further for this place.
This is that practice that’s conducive to extinguishment

SN 35.150

Mendicants, give up what’s not yours. Giving it up will be for your welfare and happiness. And what isn’t yours? The eye isn’t yours: give it up. Giving it up will be for your welfare and happiness, the ear … nose … tongue … body …mind isn’t yours: give it up. Giving it up will be for your welfare and happiness
Suppose a person was to carry off the grass, sticks, branches, and leaves in this Jeta’s Grove, or burn them, or do what they want with them. Would you think: ‘This person is carrying us off, burning us, or doing what they want with us’?”
No, sir.
Why is that? Because to us that’s neither self nor belonging to self.In the same way, the eye isn’t yours: give it up. Giving it up will be for your welfare and happiness, the ear … nose … tongue … body …mind isn’t yours: give it up. Giving it up will be for your welfare and happiness

Sn 35.138

Then a mendicant went up to the Buddha … and said to him: “Sir, how does one know and see so that substantialist view (sakkayadithi) is given up?
Mendicant, knowing and seeing the eye, sights, eye consciousness, and eye contact as suffering, substantialist view is given up

SN 35.166

Then a mendicant went up to the Buddha … and said to him: Sir, how does one know and see so that theory of self (attanudithi) is given up?
Mendicant, knowing and seeing the eye, sights, eye consciousness, and eye contact as not-self, theory of self is given up

SN 35.167

And the result is:

Someone who can prevail over those currents is said to have crossed over the ocean of the mind, with its waves and whirlpools, its saltwater crocodiles and monsters. Crossed over, gone to the far shore, the brahmin stands on solid ground
A knowledge master who’s crossed the ocean so hard to cross, with its saltwater crocodiles and monsters, its waves, whirlpools, and dangers; they’ve completed the spiritual journey, and gone to the end of the world, they’re called ‘one who has gone beyond’.”

SN 35.228

Sir, suppose someone were to describe the Buddhas of the past who have become fully quenched, cut off proliferation, cut off the course, finished off the cycle, and passed beyond all suffering. Does the eye exist by which they could be described? Does the ear … nose … tongue … body exist …does the mind exist by which they could be described?
The eye does not exist by which they could be described, the ear … nose … tongue … body does not exist …the mind does not exist by which they could be described

SN 35.83