When we speak of the six senses, modern readers often assume a biological interpretation: the eye is the physical organ of sight, the ear the organ of hearing, and so on. In the philosophical traditions of ancient India, however, the senses were understood primarily as faculties involved in the arising of experience. The Upaniṣads and early Buddhist texts both examine the six senses in this broader sense, describing their functions and their role in perception and cognition. Viewed together, these teachings present complementary perspectives on the nature of the senses and the way experience is formed.

From Atman are born prana, mind and all the sense organs

Mu Up II i.3

When it does the function of living, It is called the prana, when It speaks, the organ of speech, when It sees, the eye, when It hears, the ear and when It thinks, the mind. These are merely Its names according to its functions

Br Up I. iv. 7

Reverend, these five faculties have different domains and different ranges, and don’t experience each other’s domain and range. That is the faculties of the eye, ear, nose, tongue, and body. What do these five faculties, with their different domains and ranges, have recourse to? What experiences their domains and ranges? These five faculties, with their different domains and ranges, have recourse to the mind. And the mind experiences their domains and ranges

MN 43

Mendicant, suppose a person had never seen a parrot tree before. They’d go up to someone who had seen a parrot tree and ask them, ‘My man, what’s a parrot tree like?
They’d say, ‘A parrot tree is blackish, like a charred stump.’ Now, at that time a parrot tree may well have been just as that person saw it. Not content with that answer, that person would go up to a series of other people and receive the following answers: A parrot tree is reddish, like a scrap of meat, a parrot tree has flaking bark and burst pods, like a lebbeck tree, a parrot tree has luxuriant, shady foliage, like a banyan.
Now, at each of those times a parrot tree may well have been just as those people saw them.

SN 35.245

Brahman/Atman fancies:

This is I, This is mine, and fetters himself by his own actions as a bird by its nest

Mai Up III. 2

Is the eye the fetter of sights, or are sights the fetter of the eye? Is the ear … nose … tongue … body … mind the fetter of ideas, or are ideas the fetter of the mind?
Reverend Kāmabhū, the eye is not the fetter of sights, nor are sights the fetter of the eye. The fetter there is the desire and greed that arises from the pair of them. The ear … nose … tongue … body … mind is not the fetter of ideas, nor are ideas the fetter of the mind. The fetter there is the desire and greed that arises from the pair of them

SN 35.233

Mendicants, an unlearned ordinary person speaks of the ocean. But that’s not the ocean in the training of the Noble One. That’s just a large body of water, a large sea of water. For a person, the eye is an ocean, and its currents are made of sights. For a person, the ear … nose … tongue … body …mind is an ocean, and its currents are made of ideas

SN 35.228

Grasping arises:

There are sounds … smells … tastes … touches … ideas known by the mind, which are likable, desirable, agreeable, pleasant, sensual, and arousing. These are called the things that fuel grasping. The desire and greed for them is the grasping

SN 35.123

Suppose there was a latex-producing tree—such as a peepal, a banyan, a wavy leaf fig, or a cluster fig—that’s a tender young sapling, if a man were to chop it here and there with a sharp axe, would latex come out? Yes, sir. Why is that? Because it still has latex.” “In the same way, take any monk or nun who, when it comes to sights known by the eye, still has greed, hate, and delusion, and has not given them up. When it comes to sounds … smells … tastes … touches … ideas known by the mind, they still have greed, hate, and delusion, and have not given them up.

SN 35.231

But actually:

And what is empty of self or what belongs to self? The eye, sights, eye consciousness, and eye contact are empty of self or what belongs to self

SN 35.85

And the path is:

Mendicants, develop immersion. For a mendicant with immersion, things become truly clear. And what becomes truly clear? It becomes truly clear that the eye, sights, eye consciousness, and eye contact are impermanent. And it also becomes truly clear that the painful, pleasant, or neutral feeling that arises dependent on eye contact is impermanent.

SN 35.160

Mendicants, I will teach you a practice that’s conducive to extinguishment. Listen… What do you think, mendicants? Is the eye permanent or impermanent?
Impermanent, sir
But if it’s impermanent, is it suffering or happiness?
Suffering, sir
But if it’s impermanent, suffering, and perishable, is it fit to be regarded thus: ‘This is mine, I am this, this is my self’?
No, sir.
Are sights …eye consciousness … eye contact …The pleasant, painful, or neutral feeling that arises dependent on mind contact: is that permanent or impermanent
Impermanent, sir
But if it’s impermanent, is it suffering or happiness?
Suffering, sir.
But if it’s impermanent, suffering, and perishable, is it fit to be regarded thus: ‘This is mine, I am this, this is my self’
No, sir.
Seeing this, a learned noble disciple grows disillusioned with the eye, sights, eye consciousness, and eye contact. And they grow disillusioned with the painful, pleasant, or neutral feeling that arises dependent on eye contact, they grow disillusioned with the ear … nose … tongue … body … mind … painful, pleasant, or neutral feeling that arises dependent on mind contact. Being disillusioned, desire fades away, when desire fades away they’re freed, they understand: ‘… there is nothing further for this place.
This is that practice that’s conducive to extinguishment

SN 35.150

Mendicants, give up what’s not yours. Giving it up will be for your welfare and happiness. And what isn’t yours? The eye isn’t yours: give it up. Giving it up will be for your welfare and happiness, the ear … nose … tongue … body …mind isn’t yours: give it up. Giving it up will be for your welfare and happiness
Suppose a person was to carry off the grass, sticks, branches, and leaves in this Jeta’s Grove, or burn them, or do what they want with them. Would you think: ‘This person is carrying us off, burning us, or doing what they want with us’?”
No, sir.
Why is that? Because to us that’s neither self nor belonging to self.In the same way, the eye isn’t yours: give it up. Giving it up will be for your welfare and happiness, the ear … nose … tongue … body …mind isn’t yours: give it up. Giving it up will be for your welfare and happiness

Sn 35.138

Then a mendicant went up to the Buddha … and said to him: “Sir, how does one know and see so that substantialist view (sakkayadithi) is given up?
Mendicant, knowing and seeing the eye, sights, eye consciousness, and eye contact as suffering, substantialist view is given up

SN 35.166

Then a mendicant went up to the Buddha … and said to him: Sir, how does one know and see so that theory of self (attanudithi) is given up?
Mendicant, knowing and seeing the eye, sights, eye consciousness, and eye contact as not-self, theory of self is given up

SN 35.167

And the result is:

Someone who can prevail over those currents is said to have crossed over the ocean of the mind, with its waves and whirlpools, its saltwater crocodiles and monsters. Crossed over, gone to the far shore, the brahmin stands on solid ground
A knowledge master who’s crossed the ocean so hard to cross, with its saltwater crocodiles and monsters, its waves, whirlpools, and dangers; they’ve completed the spiritual journey, and gone to the end of the world, they’re called ‘one who has gone beyond’.”

SN 35.228

Sir, suppose someone were to describe the Buddhas of the past who have become fully quenched, cut off proliferation, cut off the course, finished off the cycle, and passed beyond all suffering. Does the eye exist by which they could be described? Does the ear … nose … tongue … body exist …does the mind exist by which they could be described?
The eye does not exist by which they could be described, the ear … nose … tongue … body does not exist …the mind does not exist by which they could be described

SN 35.83